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1. Background information: The naming dispute and the road to the 
Prespa Agreement 
 
The Prespa Agreement (PA, the Agreement) – officially titled the ‘Fi-
nal Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as Described in the 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), 
the Termination of the Interim Accord of 1995, and the Establishment 
of a Strategic Partnership between the Parties’1 – is a bilateral interna-
tional treaty. The Agreement entered into force on 12 February 2019 and 
it was signed on 17 June 2018 at the lake Prespa (after which it is unoffi-
cially named), a natural border between Greece, North Macedonia and 
Albania. The parties to the Agreement are the first two neighbouring 
states, namely Greece and North Macedonia.  
The PA’s primary object and purpose is to settle a relatively 
longstanding dispute between the two parties. This dispute arose in the 
aftermath of the former Yugoslavia’s dissolution, when North Macedo-
nia declared its independence under the constitutional name of Republic 
of Macedonia. Greece, whose northern region is also called Macedonia, 
was opposed to the use of this name by its neighbour for a number of 
reasons, involving historical concerns and fears of irredentism; however, 
the roots of this disagreement, which also pertain to history and identity-
building in the region, are considerably deeper. The dispute’s core and 
 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Liverpool School of Law and Social Justice. 
1 The UNTS volume number is not yet available. UN registration number: I-55707. 
The text of the Agreement can be found at <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
UNTS/No%20Volume/55707/Part/I-55707-0800000280544ac1.pdf>. 
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nuances cannot easily be fully appreciated by an audience that has no 
familiarity with the local history, border changes, and the movement of 
populations. These elements underpin and nourish the idiosyncratic na-
ture of this rather eccentric international dispute. Ultimately, the naming 
issue pertains to the sensitivities and, to a certain degree, the existential 
anxieties of the two neighbouring populations. On the one hand, argua-
bly the dispute concerns the (natural) need of a newly independent state, 
namely North Macedonia, to construct and demarcate its distinctive 
identity, and to use this very identity, not only as an international ‘trade-
mark’, but also as the basis for its sought-after internal cohesion and 
unity. On the other hand, the dispute stems from the (phobic, to some 
extent) reaction by another state, namely Greece, owing to the strong 
sentiment of a significant part of its population that the ingredients used 
by its new neighbour to found and portray its identity were misappropri-
ated and misused, thus challenging Greece’s own identity and historical 
narrative and, essentially, usurping and undermining the – fairly similar 
– process of identity-building through which it went at an earlier time.  
The saga before concluding the PA is rather long. Discussing in detail 
what led to the Agreement exceeds the confines of this introductory note, 
however, notable key chapters in this saga are the internationalisation of 
the dispute resulting in the involvement of the United Nations Security 
Council,2 the admission to membership of North Macedonia to the 
United Nations (UN) under a provisional international name (ie former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - FYROM),3 and the conclusion in 
1995 by the two concerned states of a bilateral Interim Accord4 contain-
ing a number of friendship and co-operation provisions. Although the 
Interim Accord did not tackle the naming dispute per se, it is clear that 
its parties saw this treaty as ‘a basis for negotiating a permanent Accord’5 
on their difference over North Macedonia’s name. To that end, the par-
ties agreed ‘to continue negotiations under the auspices of the [UN] Sec-
retary-General’ as a means for solving the naming dispute.6 Moreover, 
 
2 UNSC RES 817 (7 April 1993) UN Doc S/RES/817, para 2. 
3 UNGA Res 47/225 (8 April 1993) UN Doc A/RES/47/225. 
4 Interim Accord (between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) 
(signed 13 September 1995, entered into force 13 October 1995) 1891 UNTS 1-32193, 
3. 
5 ibid at the preamble. The permanent accord is the PA that solves the dispute. 
6 ibid art 5. 
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with the Interim  Accord, Greece recognised FYROM as an independent 
sovereign state under its provisional UN name (ie FYROM).7 The two 
parties to the Interim Accord felt it necessary to recall the principles of 
the inviolability of frontiers and of territorial integrity8 and ‘their mutual 
interest in the maintenance of international peace and security’,9 whilst 
also confirming ‘their common existing frontier as an enduring and invi-
olable international border’,10 and agreeing ‘that neither of them will as-
sert or support claims to any part of the territory of the other Party or 
claims for a change of their existing frontier.’11 Fears of irredentism can 
also be detected in Article 6 of the Interim Accord, by means of which 
FYROM declared ‘that nothing in its Constitution […] can or should be 
interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis of any claim 
[…] to any territory not within its existing borders.’12  
The Interim Accord is known to international law experts due to the 
weighty13 judgment that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered 
in the homonymous case concerning the interpretation of this treaty’s 
text. FYROM brought this case against Greece as a response to the lat-
ter’s objection (essentially Greece’s veto) to its (ie FYROM’s) admission 
to NATO in April 2008.14 This conduct was a means for Greece to com-
pel its neighbour to negotiate a mutually agreed name and to react to the 
significant number of states that had recognised it with its constitutional 
name (ie Macedonia). With its judgment in the Application of the Interim 
Accord of 13 September 1995 case, the ICJ found that, by hindering the 
admission of its neighbour to NATO, Greece had breached Article 11(1) 
of the Interim Accord.15  
 
7 ibid art 1. 
8 ibid at the preamble and in art 3.  
9 ibid. 
10 ibid art 2. 
11 ibid art 4. 
12 ibid art 6(1). 
13 Amongst other reasons, due to the analysis it contains on countermeasures. 
14 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia v Greece) (Judgment) [2011] ICJ Rep 644. 
15 Art 11(1) of the Interim Accord (n 4) reads: ‘Upon entry into force of this Interim 
Accord, [Greece] agrees not to object to the application by or the membership of 
[FYROM] in international, multilateral and regional organizations and institutions of 
which [Greece] is a member; however, [Greece] reserves the right to object to any 
membership referred to above if and to the extent of [FYROM] is to be referred to in 
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2. The Prespa Agreement: Its architecture and key features 
 
One cannot tell with certainty if or to what extent this ICJ judgment 
stirred Greece and North Macedonia to conclude the PA, but – as is ex-
plained in more detail below – it is this Agreement that paved the way for 
North Macedonia’s forthcoming accession to NATO.16 Most signifi-
cantly, the PA settles an international dispute in an amicable, mutually 
accepted and, hopefully, sustainable17 way that opens the way for deeper 
co-operation between the two neighbouring nations and for North Mac-
edonia’s participation in the process of European integration and, more 
generally, in international institutions.   
As is reflected within its structure, the PA’s purpose is twofold. First 
and foremost, the Agreement aims at solving the aforementioned dispute 
between the two contracting states over North Macedonia’s name. The 
second purpose concerns the ‘intensification and enrichment of co-oper-
ation between’18 Greece and North Macedonia in a number of areas; 
thus, Part 2 of the Agreement amounts to a rather typical friendship and 
co-operation bilateral treaty. Language in this Part is, to an extent, ab-
stract and soft – ie it often points to a direction19 and/or makes declara-
tions20 that are not necessarily constitutive of concrete obligations or 
rights.  
 
such organization or institution differently than in paragraph 2 of the United Nations 
Security Council resolution 817 (1993)’. 
16 North Macedonia has not yet joined NATO. A Protocol to the North Atlantic 
Treaty on the Accession of the Republic of North Macedonia was signed on 6 February 
2019, but this has not yet entered into force as, according to art II of the Protocol, all 
parties to the North Atlantic Treaty need to ratify it before it enters into force.  
17 See discussion that follows and the Preamble of the Prespa Agreement (n 1), which 
declares resolving the dispute in a dignified and sustainable manner.  
18 Title of Part 2 of the Prespa Agreement (n 1). 
19 For example, see art 14(5) of the Prespa Agreement (n 1), which reads: ‘The Parties 
shall promote, extend and improve cooperative synergies in the areas of infrastructures 
and transport as well as on a reciprocal basis, road, rail, maritime and air transport and 
communication connections, using the best available technologies and practices.’ 
20 For example, see the first sentence of art 15 of the Prespa Agreement (n 1), which 
reads: ‘In the age of the new industrial revolution and second age of machines, the deep-
ening of cooperation amongst States and societies is necessary now more than ever […]’. 
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As already explained, Part 1 of the PA is devoted to the naming dis-
pute. The PA is final and terminates the Interim Accord.21 This does not, 
however, mean that the two instruments (ie the PA and the Interim Ac-
cord) do not partially coincide. For instance, the PA echoes the provi-
sions of the Interim Accord that refer to the inviolability of frontiers and 
to territorial integrity.22 Moreover, the parties to the PA reiterate ‘their 
common existing frontier as an enduring and inviolable international 
border [and agree, inter alia, that n]either Party shall assert or support 
any claims to any part of the territory of the other Party or claims for a 
change to their common existing frontier’.23 As far as irredentism is con-
cerned, amongst other provisions within the Agreement, the parties com-
mit and declare that their national constitutions, as they are in force or as 
they may be amended in the future, cannot and should not ‘be inter-
preted as constituting […] the basis for any claim to any area that is not 
included in its existing international borders’.24 In similar terms, the par-
ties undertake, inter alia, ‘not to make or to authorize any irredentist 
statements […]’,25 and they commit to prevent conduct likely to incite 
chauvinism, hostility, irredentism, and revisionism against the other 
party. This not only includes when such acts are attributable to the state, 
but also when they are committed by private entities whose conduct is 
not attributable to either party.26 Applying the same logic, Article 3(4) of 
the Agreement provides inter  alia that ‘[n]either Party shall allow its ter-
ritory to be used against the other Party by any third country, Organiza-
tion, group or individual carrying out or attempting to carry out subver-
sive, secessionist actions, or actions or activities which threaten in any 
manner the peace, stability or security of the other Party.’27 In a nutshell, 
 
21 This is reflected within the title of the Prespa Agreement (n 1) and is also explicit 
in art 1.  
22 Prespa Agreement (n 1), for instance at the preamble and within arts 3(2) and 5(2). 
23 ibid art 3(1). 
24 ibid art 4(1). 
25 ibid art 4(2). 
26 ibid art 6. It should be noted, however, that this provision can raise concerns to 
the extent that it may clash with fundamental human rights binding the parties to the PA. 
For instance, historical revisionism may clash with (academic) freedom of expression. Art 
5 of the Agreement refers to human rights, both in general and in respect to a number of 
international human rights instruments, holding, inter alia, that in the conduct of their 
affairs, the parties to the Agreement shall be guided by the spirit and principles of human 
rights. 
27 ibid art 3(4). 
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the PA also establishes (admittedly, in a manner that rather lacks detail 
and specification as to the exact standards of the expected conduct) some 
positive obligations of means (ie a duty to demonstrate due diligence) 
regarding the offering of protection from the conduct of non-state actors. 
As far as the dispute between the two states is concerned, the PA 
declares28 that it solves the issue once and for all. To that end, one of its 
final clauses provides that the Agreement’s provisions ‘shall remain in 
force for an indefinite period of time and are irrevocable.’29 Moreover, 
the drafters of the PA included in the same Article a rather peculiar – but 
also legally inoperative30 – clause, providing that ‘[n]o modification to 
this Agreement contained in Article 1(3) and Article 1(4) is permitted.’31 
This clause essentially aims at partially ‘locking’ the Agreement by pre-
venting future generations from revisiting and/or amending some of its 
key provisions concerning the naming dispute. Irrespective of any reser-
vations one may express as to the unamendability of certain parts of the 
PA, this language is indicative of the intention of the parties to treat this 
Agreement as an enduring, permanent basis that contains the definitive 
terms of the settlement of their dispute.   
Articles 1(3) and 1(4) – whose modification is not permitted accord-
ing to the PA – concern the settlement of the dispute and the entry into 
force of the Agreement. Article 1(3) in particular refers to the core of the 
dispute, that is, the treaty’s primary object and purpose. The Agreement 
establishes ‘North Macedonia’ as the new, mutually accepted name,32 
‘Macedonian/citizen of the Republic of North Macedonia’ as this state’s 
nationality,33 and ‘Macedonian’ as its official language.34 In that respect, 
Article 1(3) explicitly points to Article 7 of the Agreement, whereby the 
parties ‘acknowledge that their respective understanding of the terms 
“Macedonia” and “Macedonian” refers to a different historical context 
and cultural heritage’,35 and clarify that ‘the Macedonian language, is 
 
28 This is reflected in the titles of the Prespa Agreement (n 1) and of its first Part. The 
preamble and art 20(5) of the Agreement are explicit in that respect.  
29 Prespa Agreement (n 1) art 20(9). 
30 To the extent that it prevents sovereign will from producing legal effects in the 
future.  
31 Prespa Agreement (n 1) art 20(9). 
32 ibid art 1(3)(a). 
33 ibid art 1(3)(b). 
34 ibid art 1(3)(c). 
35 ibid art 7(1). 
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within the group of South Slavic languages [and that this language is] not 
related to the ancient Hellenic civilization, history, culture and heritage 
of the northern region of [Greece].’36 The PA goes into quite some detail 
regarding the use of the terminologies in dispute – ie Macedonia(n). Its 
provisions span from the use of the terms at issue on car license plates,37 
to the adjectival reference to state public entities,38 whilst also leaving 
certain issues to be negotiated in the future.39  
It is very interesting – and a rather distinctive feature of this treaty – 
that the PA requires the amendment of North Macedonia’s national con-
stitution as a means for this state to adopt the new terminologies agreed 
upon by the parties40 and, as is discussed below, as a precondition for 
Greece to accept being bound by the PA. The Agreement is explicit and 
detailed as to the required constitutional modifications.41 According to 
Article 1(3)(g), North Macedonia ‘shall adopt [this name] as its official 
name and the terminologies referred to in Article 1(3) through its internal 
procedure that is both binding and irrevocable, entailing the amendment 
of the Constitution as agreed in this Agreement’.42 This means that no 
future amendment of national law, including the North Macedonian con-
stitution, can modify the terminologies in dispute (such as the constitu-
tional name of the state) without breaching the PA.  
The constitutional amendment within the North Macedonian legal 
order is part of a rather complex ‘choreography’ and set of preliminary 
steps and preconditions for the PA to enter into force. In this respect, 
both Articles 20(2) and (3) of the Agreement, which are part of the final 
clauses of it and concern the ratification of the Agreement and its entry 
into force, refer to Article 1 and to the steps that this Article enlists as 
preconditions before the Agreement can become legally binding. This 
 
36 ibid art 7(4). 
37 ibid art 1(3)(e). 
38 ibid art 1(3)(f). 
39 ibid art 1(3)(h), concerning commercial names, trademarks etc. 
40 ibid arts 1(3)(g), 1(4)(d) and (e), 1(11) and 1(12). 
41 ibid art 1(12), reading: ‘The name and terminologies as referred to In Article 1 of 
this Agreement shall be incorporated in the Constitution of [North Macedonia]. This 
change shall take place en bloc with one amendment. Pursuant to this amendment, the 
name and terminologies will change accordingly in all articles of the Constitution. Fur-
thermore, [North Macedonia] shall proceed to the appropriate amendments of Its Pre-
amble, Article 3 and Article 49, during the procedure of the revision of the Constitution.’ 
42 ibid arts 1(3)(g). 
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‘choreography’ (ie the sequence of steps to be followed by each party 
towards the ratification of the Agreement) is quite telling. It is revelatory, 
not only of the complexity of the dispute, but also of the issues that the 
parties considered as a conditio sine qua non for accepting to be bound, 
of their priorities, but also of the process that the parties felt was neces-
sary as a means for them to build the volume of trust that would allow 
them to  confidently make the PA legally binding by ratifying it. Thus, 
according to Article 1(4) of the PA, upon signing the Agreement, North 
Macedonia was expected to submit it to its Parliament for ratification.43 
To that end, it could hold a referendum.44 Moreover, as aforementioned, 
North Macedonia had to amend its national constitution45 and notify ac-
cordingly Greece, which would be then expected to ratify the Agree-
ment.46  
Upon receiving the notice of the ratification of the PA by North Mac-
edonia, Greece had to promptly ‘notify the President of the Council of 
the EU that it supports the opening of the EU accession negotiations of 
[North Macedonia] under the [… terminologies agreed, and] notify the 
Secretary General of NATO that it supports the extension of an acces-
sion invitation by NATO to [North Macedonia].’47 Greece’s support for 
North Macedonia’s accession to NATO was ‘conditional, first, to an out-
come of referendum, if [North Macedonia] decide[d] to hold one […] 
and, second, to the completion of the constitutional amendments pro-
vided for in th[e Prespa] Agreement. Upon receipt of notification by 
[North Macedonia] concerning the completion of all its internal legal 
procedures for the entry into force of th[e Prespa] Agreement, including 
a possible national referendum with an outcome consistent with th[e 
Prespa] Agreement, and upon conclusion of the amendments in the Con-
stitution of [North Macedonia], [Greece] shall ratify [North Macedo-
nia]’s NATO Accession Protocol. This ratification procedure shall be 
concluded together with the ratification procedure of this Agreement.’48 
Accordingly, for the PA to enter into force, North Macedonia had to 
amend its constitution so that it complied with the PA (and Greece’s 
 
43 ibid art 1(4)(a). 
44 ibid art 1(4)(c). 
45 ibid arts 1(4)(d) and 1(11). 
46 ibid art 1(4)(f). 
47 ibid art 2(4)(a) and (b). 
48 ibid art 2(4)(b). 
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concerns regarding irredentism and the use of the names/terminologies 
in dispute), whilst Greece committed to ratify the instrument on North 
Macedonia’s accession to NATO.  
Interestingly, this sequence of acts before the PA entered into force 
– and as a precondition for the same – resulted in certain provisions of 
the Agreement being implemented before its official ratification by the 
two parties and its entry into force. This raises a noteworthy theoretical 
question as to whether the provisions of the PA that had to be imple-
mented before the parties ratified it – and for the parties to ratify it – 
produced normativity (ie whether the provisions at issue became legally 
binding for the parties before the PA entered into force). The purpose 
and confines of this introductory note do not permit the exploration of 
this question in depth. Suffice it to explain that one approach, for exam-
ple, would be to treat the PA’s text as essentially containing two agree-
ments, one of which is an agreement in simplified form that develops 
normativity and produces legal effects upon its signature by the two gov-
ernments, ie a legally binding agreement for which no ratification (thus 
approval by the national parliaments) is necessary. Another approach 
would see the PA’s text as containing two agreements, with the difference 
in this second scenario that the part of the PA’s negotium being imple-
mented before the ratification of the PA instrument by the parties 
amounts to a non-binding gentlemen’s agreement that comprises of po-
litical commitments not intended to establish legally binding rights/obli-
gations. Rather, such a non-legally enforceable agreement merely oper-
ates on the basis of good faith.  
The second scenario seems more convincing. A combination of two 
factors support the labelling of part of the PA as a gentlemen’s agree-
ment. First, indeed, this Agreement contains a number of provisions that 
were designed to be implemented (and which were implemented, ie they 
led to specific conduct) by the parties before the PA entered into force. 
Second, it does not seem that the intention of the parties was to establish 
the aforementioned required steps/conduct for the Agreement’s entry 
into force as legally binding obligations, the breach of which would en-
gage their international responsibility. In similar terms, the nature of the 
arrangements and the provisions of the part of the PA that amount to a 
gentlemen’s agreement are such that they establish no solid/proper legal 
obligations. Rather, they offer a ‘roadmap’ and set a framework of (polit-
ical) conditionality for the parties to feel secure enough, that is, to be 
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satisfied to turn the remaining agreement (ie the part of PA’s negotium 
that had not been yet implemented) into a formally legally binding in-
strument. As such, had North Macedonia failed to amend its constitution 
in a way that would meet the requirements of the PA, this ‘omission’ 
would not amount to a breach of an international obligation, that is to 
say, no internationally wrongful conduct would exist in that case. How-
ever, unless Greece subsequently consented to different arrangements, 
this ‘omission’ by North Macedonia would prevent the PA from entering 
into force. It is evident, therefore, that good faith is very important within 
this framework, including both the gentlemen’s agreement (which is also 
a means to build trust between the parties) and the rest of the PA. In any 
event, this is also reflected within Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which states that, when signing a 
treaty, states assume an obligation not to defeat its object and purpose 
prior to its entry into force.49  
 
 
3. The meaning and the effects of erga omnes within the Prespa Agree-
ment: Some scenarios to explore 
 
The key features and elements of the PA that were identified and 
briefly discussed earlier in this note are not the only noteworthy ones. 
Considering, however, that it is impossible to analyse all notable elements 
within this issue of Questions of International Law, the focus of the pa-
pers contained herewith and of the discussion that follows in this note is 
on one particular theoretical set of interconnected issues raised by the 
PA provisions, namely the use of the term ‘erga omnes’ within the Agree-
ment, the meaning and effects of this term within this context, and the 
associated questions of who is bound by the PA and, accordingly, who 
may invoke the international responsibility of a wrongdoer in case of 
breach of its provisions or, more generally, who may enforce it.  
Erga omnes appears twice in the text of the Agreement. First, in Ar-
ticle 1(3)(a), which reads: ‘The official name of the Second Party [ie the 
state nowadays named North Macedonia] shall be the “Republic of 
North Macedonia”, which shall be the constitutional name of the Second 
 
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into 
force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 art 18. 
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Party and shall be used erga omnes, as provided for in this Agreement. 
The short name of the Second Party shall be “North Macedonia”.’50 The 
second instance is in Article 1(8), which explains the meaning of erga 
omnes. This Article reads: ‘Upon entry into force of this Agreement and 
taking into account its Article 1(9) and (10), the Parties shall use the name 
and terminologies of Article 1(3) for all usages and all purposes erga om-
nes, that is, domestically, in all their bilateral relations, and in all regional 
and international Organizations and institutions.’51  
These two Articles must be read in conjunction with other provisions 
that imply erga omnes – in the sense that this term is employed within the 
PA – without explicitly mentioning the term. For instance, according to 
Article 1(5), ‘[u]pon entry into force of th[e Prespa] Agreement, the Par-
ties shall use the name and terminologies of Article 1(3) in all relevant 
international multilateral and regional Organizations, institutions and 
fora, including all meetings and correspondence, and in all their bilateral 
relations with all Member States of the United Nations.’52 Unlike Article 
1(5), which concerns the international use of the agreed terminologies, 
Article 1(9) deals with the internal use of the same. Thus, Article 1(9) 
provides that ‘[u]pon entry into force of th[e Prespa] Agreement, [North 
Macedonia] shall promptly in accordance with sound administrative 
practice take all necessary measures so as the country’s competent Au-
thorities henceforth use internally the name and terminologies of Article 
1(3) of this Agreement in all new official documentation, correspondence 
and relevant materials.’  
Read as an ensemble, these provisions support the contention that 
the term ‘erga omnes’ refers to the use of the agreed terminologies for all 
usages and all purposes in three different levels/instances. First, the par-
ties to the PA must employ the terminologies at issue domestically.53 Sec-
ond, they must employ the terminologies in the framework of their bilat-
eral relationship.54 Finally, the terminologies must be also used in all of 
their international relations,55 both regarding international institutions 
 
50 Prespa Agreement (n 1) art 1(3)(a). 
51 ibid art 1(8). 
52 ibid art 1(5). 
53 ibid arts 1(8) and 1(9). 
54 ibid art 1(8). 
55 ibid arts 1(5) and 1(8). 
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and in their relations with other states. To that end, under the PA, North 
Macedonia assumes a duty to  
 
‘[n]otify all international, multilateral and regional Organizations, insti-
tutions and fora of which it is a member of the entry into force of th[e 
Prespa] Agreement, and request that all those Organizations, institu-
tions and fora thereafter shall adopt and use the name and terminologies 
referred to in Article 1(3) of this Agreement for all usages and purposes. 
Both Parties shall also refer to [North Macedonia] in accordance with 
Article 1(3) in all communications to, with, and in those Organizations, 
institutions and fora. [Moreover, North Macedonia shall n]otify all 
Member States of the United Nations of the entry into force of th[e 
Prespa] Agreement and shall request them to adopt and use the name 
and terminologies referred to in Article 1(3) of this Agreement for all 
usages and purposes, including in all their bilateral relations and com-
munications.’56 
 
Accordingly, with the PA the two states parties agreed to employ the 
terminologies at issue for all usages and purposes both domestically and 
internationally. The latter dimension does not only concern the bilateral 
relationship between the two parties to the PA, but all international oc-
casions within the framework of and in their relations with all types of 
international institutions, in addition to their international relations with 
all other UN member states. This appears to be the meaning of the term 
‘erga omnes’ within the PA context; therefore, prima facie, this term is 
employed within the Agreement as a rhetorical flourish that aims at en-
dowing the PA with the gravitas of legal Latin. On the other hand, it may 
also be seen as a convenient (yet, not as clear as one would wish) way to 
explain the use of the agreed terminologies in a concise manner. Thus, 
erga omnes must be read literally. It rather serves a descriptive purpose. 
Accordingly, it is not used as a term of art denoting a particular type of 
international obligations. Rather, it refers to the instances when and the 
persons vis-à-vis whom the agreed terminologies must be used; not vis-à-
vis whom the obligation to employ these terminologies is owed. Thus, at 
first sight, the obligation to use the agreed terminologies for all usages 
and all purposes, erga omnes, both domestically and internationally is a 
bilateral obligation that one party to the PA owes to the other party. 
 
56 ibid art 1(6). 
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Thus, the PA establishes obligations linked with self-interests that are ex-
clusive to each contracting state uti singuli. In different words, the term 
‘erga omnes’ is not referring to obligations that one state owes towards all 
other states (parties to a treaty, if the obligation stems from a multilateral 
treaty) because these obligations pertain to common interests/values, the 
breach of which concerns the international community as a whole (or all 
state parties, if the obligation stems from a multilateral treaty). Mutatis 
mutandis, at first sight, erga omnes within the PA does not justify collec-
tive enforcement by non-injured states in case of breach of the obligation 
to employ the agreed terminologies.57     
This reading of the term ‘erga omnes’ in the PA is also (partially, as is 
argued below) supported by Article 1(13), which provides that ‘[i]n the 
event of mistakes, errors, omissions in the proper reference of the name 
and terminologies referred to in Article 1(3) of this Agreement in the 
context of international multilateral and regional Organizations, institu-
tions, correspondence, meetings and fora, as well as in all bilateral rela-
tions of [North Macedonia] with third States and entities, either of the 
Parties may request their immediate rectification and the avoidance of 
similar mistakes in the future.’58 The text of this provision employs the 
word ‘may’ rather than the stronger term ‘shall’. Due to this, the parties 
to the Agreement enjoy discretion, that is, the provision establishes a 
right and not a duty for the parties. Moreover, although cessation of 
wrongfulness and (assurances and guarantees of) non-repetition corre-
spond to key secondary obligations, ie key consequences of an interna-
tionally wrongful act,59 Article 1(3) of the PA does not (necessarily) con-
cern reaction to wrongfulness by an injured state. Nevertheless, it is rev-
elatory of who the parties to the PA understand to have an interest in 
seeing the treaty duly implemented and the terminologies that it estab-
lishes employed. It is the parties to the Agreement that have such an in-
terest and not any third actor vis-à-vis whom the agreed terminologies 
must be used.  
These observations support the argument that, on the face of it, the 
PA is a bilateral treaty establishing reciprocal, synallagmatic obligations 
 
57 ILC, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001) 
UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) art 48. 
58 Prespa Agreement (n 1) art 1(13). 
59 ILC, ‘Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (n 57) 
art 30. 
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pertaining to interests that, prima facie, are exclusive to the two parties to 
the Agreement. Read in this way, the PA does not create any obligations 
or rights for third parties. As such, in case of breach of the obligation to 
employ the agreed terminologies erga omnes, those injured can only be 
one of the two parties to the PA. Accordingly, only one of the two parties 
to the Agreement is entitled to invoke the responsibility of the other party 
when such party violates the Agreement. Mutatis mutandis, under this 
logic, third states cannot be injured and have no interest in invoking the 
responsibility of one of the parties to the Agreement or of any third 
state/actor when they do not employ the agreed terminologies. This read-
ing is supported by both the text of the PA and by the VCLT. Starting 
with the former, Article 20(7) provides that the PA ‘is not directed 
against any other State, entity or person. It does not infringe on the rights 
and duties resulting from bilateral and multilateral agreements already in 
force that the Parties have concluded with other States or international 
Organizations.’60 With respect to the VCLT, it is common knowledge 
that its text explicitly provides that a treaty cannot establish rights or du-
ties for third states without their consent.61 In addition to the requirement 
for express acceptance in writing by third states, another precondition 
set by the VCLT for a treaty to establish an obligation for third states is 
that its parties intended to do so, ie that the states parties intended to 
establish an obligation for third states.62 In quite similar terms, both the 
intention of the parties to a treaty and the assent (that can also be pre-
sumed in this case) of third states are necessary for a treaty to establish 
rights for third states.63 
In light of this, a preliminary conclusion that may be reached on the 
basis of the argumentation given thus far is that the PA is a typical bilat-
eral international treaty. As such, it establishes no rights or obligations 
for third states. However, this reading and ‘labelling’ of the PA neglects 
certain factors that may invite us to reconsider this conclusion. For in-
stance, the PA is a bilateral international treaty that does not exclusively 
concern the relationship between the two parties, but also the use of the 
 
60 Prespa Agreement (n 1) art 20(7). 
61 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 49) art 34.   
62 ibid art 35. 
63 ibid art 36. Assent in art 36 VCLT implies a more passive stance, compared to 
consent provided by art 35 VCLT. See also the French version of art 36 which employs 
the term ‘consentement’ rather than ‘assent’.   
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agreed terminologies by the parties in their international relations with 
third actors, such as states and international institutions. Inevitably, this 
invites us to explore whether these third actors may assume any rights or 
obligations under the PA. For instance, what are the legal consequences 
of the acceptance by non-parties of the request addressed to them on the 
basis of the PA to adopt and use the new terminologies? Could the re-
quest by North Macedonia that international institutions shall (according 
to the text of 1(6)(a) – emphasis added) adopt and use the terminologies 
at issue for all purposes and usages be interpreted as showing the inten-
tion of the parties to the PA to open this particular aspect of the treaty 
(ie the use of the new terminologies) to third actors? Does the acceptance 
by a state or an international organisation of a request to employ the new 
terminologies establish a duty for them to thereafter employ these termi-
nologies? And, if the PA can establish obligations for non-parties who 
accept to be bound, vis-à-vis whom do (non-)parties owe the obligation 
to use the new terminologies? In similar terms, who would be entitled to 
react in case of breach of the obligation to employ the terminologies and 
against whom?  
Thus far, it has been suggested in this note that the PA may be read 
as being a typical bilateral treaty, ruled by the maxim res inter alios acta, 
aliis nec nocet nec prodest, or a bilateral treaty, a part of which is aimed at 
establishing obligations (and rights) for consenting non-parties. Outside 
of these two readings of the PA, a third scenario is also possible and wor-
thy of exploration. Be it a bilateral treaty, the PA is solving an interna-
tional dispute that involves inter alia peace in the Balkans and irreden-
tism. Arguably, the Agreement and especially the terminologies that it 
adopts are a means of prevention of territorial claims, tension and con-
flict. This is clear in both the Interim Accord and in the PA. The PA thus 
serves purposes that are not solely ‘private’, and which do not exclusively 
concern the interests of the parties to it, as peace, conflict prevention and 
the preservation of the existing borders are also a matter of general inter-
est. This suggests that the PA could fall within the category of treaties 
establishing an objective regime, ie a regime binding everyone and which 
ought to be respected by everyone, including non-parties to the Agree-
ment. Qualifying part of the PA as an objective regime would imply the 
establishment of an obligation owed by all actors vis-à-vis all other actors, 
that is to say, an obligation erga omnes. Indeed, the term ‘erga omnes’ is 
commonly employed in the context of objective regimes, which produce 
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objective effects that bind universally all states/actors irrespective of their 
will. If the term ‘erga omnes’ is used in the PA in this sense, this would 
mean that non-parties to the PA owe an obligation vis-à-vis all other 
states and international organisations to adopt and employ the terminol-
ogies at issue irrespective of their will/consent. An associated question in 
this framework would be whether, outside of the duty that all actors have 
erga omnes to use the terminology at issue for all usages and all purposes, 
these actors also have a right to invoke the responsibility of an actor who 
fails to employ the agreed terminologies.   
 
 
4. In this issue of Questions of International Law 
 
In summer 2018, a few days following the release of the PA’s text, the 
author of the present introductory note published a comment in Greek 
assessing the Agreement from a normative perspective (ie concerning its 
desirability), whilst also considering some of its more technical dimen-
sions.64 Although such note was written for a broader audience (ie non 
experts), it argued inter alia that, as parts of the PA concern general in-
terest,  especially peace, irredentism and territorial integrity, Greece and 
North Macedonia could treat the part of the Agreement that concerns 
the use of the new terminologies as establishing an objective regime. That 
is, the argument could be made that the term ‘erga omnes’ within the PA 
has been chosen by the parties with the intention to establish an objective 
regime with regard to the agreed terminologies. Admittedly, this should 
be (more) clear and unequivocal in the Agreement. Additionally, an im-
portant obstacle to this reading is Article 20(7), which, as already ex-
plained, provides that the PA is not directed against non-parties.  
Ultimately, however, many things in law are a matter of interpreta-
tion. For instance, Article 1(6) was discussed earlier in this note concern-
ing the positive duty that it establishes for North Macedonia to notify 
third actors of the entry of the PA into force and request them to adopt 
and employ the new terminologies. As already argued, the request 
 
64 VP Tzevelekos, ‘Μία πρώτη αποτίμηση της συμφωνίας για το Μακεδονικό’ [‘A 
First Assessment of the Agreement on the Macedonian Dispute’] (2018) The Books’ 
Journal <http://booksjournal.gr/%CE%B3%CE%BD%CF%8E%CE%BC%CE%B5 
%CF%82/item/2761-makedoniko-mia-prvth-apotimhsh>. 
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provided by Article 1(6) may be interpreted as the parties to the PA in-
tending to open their Agreement to third parties. However, different in-
terpretations are also possible. For example, rather than containing an 
invitation to non-parties to consent to being bound to employ the new 
terminologies, Article 1(6) could be understood as merely exemplifying 
the means through which North Macedonia is expected to promote the 
new terminologies. This reading of Article 1(6) is compatible with the 
other two scenarios given earlier, namely that the PA is a typical bilateral 
treaty that produces no effects for non-parties or that part of this Agree-
ment establishes an objective regime. Another possible reading of Article 
1(6) is that it reflects the intention of the parties to invite as many non-
parties as possible to consent to be bound to adopt the new terminologies 
and provides at the same time the means to be employed to that end. 
With respect to the means of promoting the new terminologies in the PA, 
as the author of the present note also argued within his 2018 comment, 
these means are rather passive and, thus, inadequate. The primary obli-
gation for the parties under the PA is negative, consisting of a duty to 
abstain from using the old terminologies, whereas the standards of posi-
tive obligations to actively promote the agreed terminologies – consisting 
essentially in North Macedonia’s duty to introduce itself to the rest of the 
world with its new name and in requesting third actors to employ this 
name and the associated terminologies – are rather low.  
A further example of an equivocal provision that is susceptible to al-
ternative interpretations is Article 1(13), which – as already explained – 
enables either of the parties to the Agreement to request the rectification 
and the avoidance of any mistakes, errors and omissions in the use of the 
new terminologies by third actors. Earlier in this introductory note, Article 
1(13) was mentioned in connection with the first scenario pertaining to the 
meaning of the term ‘erga omnes’ in the PA, namely the scenario that treats 
this treaty as a purely bilateral, synallagmatic instrument that only binds 
the parties to it. However, Article 1(13) may also be read as supporting the 
third aforementioned scenario, which understands erga omnes as referring 
to the establishment of an objective regime on the basis of which all actors 
must employ the new terminologies. Accordingly, under the latter reading, 
what the two interested parties (ie Greece and North Macedonia) wish to 
achieve with Article 1(3) is to permit them to react to the conduct of non-
parties who undermine the effectiveness of the objective regime that they 
are establishing with respect to the new terminologies. 
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These examples serve to illustrate why the meaning of the term ‘erga 
omnes’ within the PA and the answer to the question of who is bound to 
employ the new terminologies under this Agreement depend upon how 
its terms will be practiced and, more generally, interpreted in the future. 
With this in mind, the author of the present note invited his colleagues, 
Dr Ioannis Prezas and Dr Vassilis Pergantis, to contribute to this issue of 
Questions of International Law by treating the PA as a case study that 
asks scholars to explore the meaning and the effects of the term ‘erga 
omnes’ within this particular context, and to opine as to the obligations 
and rights this treaty potentially establishes for non-parties. Pergantis and 
Prezas partially concur and partially diverge in their reading of the PA. 
Starting with a key point of convergence, both authors hold that the 
term ‘erga omnes’ in the PA is not used to refer to the aforementioned 
class of international obligations that are owed to the international com-
munity as a whole (because they safeguard collective interests/values). 
Accordingly, collective enforcement and invocation of responsibility by 
non-injured states are impossible. In this respect, Prezas’ analysis makes 
a thought-provoking point regarding the right of non-parties to invoke 
the responsibility of the parties to the PA if they (ie the parties) fail to 
employ the agreed terminologies. According to Prezas, such a right could 
stem, not from the PA itself, but from a separate source, namely a joint 
unilateral act contained within the PA that would serve as a basis for the 
parties to confer a right to non-parties to react in case of a breach by the 
parties of their duties pertaining to the agreed terminologies. However, 
Prezas admits that the most plausible interpretation of the PA is that it 
does not contain or envisage any such joint unilateral acts. Pergantis and 
Prezas thus coincide in their contentions that the obligation to use the 
agreed terminologies in the PA is owed inter partes – not vis-à-vis non-
parties.  This explains why both authors point to the United Nations Se-
curity Council, arguing that it could endow (by means of and on the basis 
of UN law) the new terminologies with (quasi-)objective effects.   
The involvement of the Security Council is explored by Prezas and 
Pergantis because they concur that the third scenario given earlier in this 
note, namely that part of the PA amounts to an objective regime, is not 
tenable. However, their reasoning differs substantially in that respect. 
Prezas squarely rejects the concept of objective regimes all together. Sup-
posing that it existed in positive international law, his view is that the PA 
would not fall within this concept. On the other hand, Pergantis believes 
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that the concept of objective regimes exists, and that the PA can qualify 
as a status treaty that raises issues of general interest. Therefore, accord-
ing to Pergantis, the PA has the potential to develop objective effects. It 
does, however, fail to do so, the reason being that the contracting parties 
did not intend for it to develop such effects.   
As far as other points of divergence between the two authors are con-
cerned, in his thoughtful and thorough analysis, Pergantis suggests that 
the PA must be read as merely establishing rights and obligations for the 
two contracting parties. Unless the Security Council interferes in a way 
that essentially ‘objectivises’ the new terminologies, third actors enjoy full 
discretion as to whether to recognise North Macedonia with its new 
name. This is also supported by his reading of Article 1(6), which con-
cerns the request/invitation by North Macedonia to third actors to use 
the new terminologies. Pergantis understands this as establishing a thin 
obligation of conduct for North Macedonia that reflects the doubts of 
the two contracting states that their bilateral treaty can produce third 
party effects. Prezas’ sophisticated paper suggests that Article 1(6) can 
lead to non-parties accepting an obligation to employ the new terminol-
ogies, provided that, by requesting third parties to employ the new ter-
minologies, the parties to the PA intended to open their Agreement to 
third parties. In accordance with this understanding, the request amounts 
to an invitation to non-parties to assume an international obligation un-
der the PA. Essentially, this results – according to Prezas – in a new agree-
ment between the requesting state(s) and the actor who consents to use 
the new terminologies.  
Finally, both Prezas and Pergantis refer to general international law, 
particularly the principle of non-interference with the affairs of others. 
However, they use these same ‘ingredients’ to make different points. Es-
sentially, Pergantis submits that the sovereign right of third states to re-
fuse to recognise North Macedonia with its new constitutional name 
trumps the duty that states have under general international law (e.g. 
principle of non-interference) to respect the stipulations of the PA. Pre-
zas’ analysis employs the same principle (associated with a particular con-
ception of ‘opposability’) to make the argument that only third parties 
whose rights may be affected by the PA can challenge this treaty. Accord-
ing to Prezas, all other third parties have a duty to respect, tolerate and 
abstain from challenging the use of the new terminologies by the parties 
or by any other third party.  
